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VIRGINIA AND THE CONTROL OF FISHING
RIGHTS
JAMEs A. LErwicu
The power of the state to regulate fishing in her public
waters has become an accepted doctrine in this country.' The
doctrine purportedly emerged from the English common law
which vested the ownership of ferae naturae2 in the .sovereign.
While there is some dispute among the authorities whether-the
ownership theory became the common law of England in fact or
by error in Blackstone's interpretation of the common law,3 it
was undoubtedly incorporated into the law of the United States
in 1896 by the case of Geer v. Connecticut.4
The regulatory powers so extended to the several states were
exercised as early as 1780 in Virginia. By act of that year the
shores of all streams in eastern Virginia, not then granted, were
reserved as fishing commons.5 In 1785 Virginia entered into a
treaty with Maryland for the regulation of fish and oysters in
the Potomac River."
In upholding the validity of a tax required by Act of As-
sembly approved March 3, 1898,7 Judge Buchanan stated in
Morgan's Case at page 814:
"Neither is a license tax upon the residents of the
State, for the privilege of fishing in the waters belonging
to the State in violation of any pro.Vision of the Con-
1McCready v. Virginia, 27 Gratm. (68 Va.) 985 (1876), aff. in 94 U.S. 391
(1876); Johnson v. Haydel.279 U.S. 16 (1928).
2 Fish are considered ferae naturae. Gratz v. McKee, 260 U.S. 123 (1922);
Lincoln v. Davis, 53 Mich. 375, 19 N.W. 103 (1884).
3 Govermnental Problems in Wild Life Conservation, Robert H. Connery,
Columbia U.Press, 1935, pp. 56 to 63.
4 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
5 Minor's Institutes, Vol. 11, p. 14. See also Va. Code, 1873, ch. 62 §§1, 2.
For a case involving this act see Garnson v. Hall, 25 Gratt. (66 Va.)
150 (1881).
6 Compact of 1785, 12 Hen.Stat. 50, I.R.C., p. 53, c. 18; Va. Code, §7-6
(1950).
7 Acts of Assembly, 1897.28, p. 864.
stitution of the State or of the United States. The nav-
igable waters of the State and the soil under them with-
in its territorial limits are the property of the State
... and it has a right to control them as it sees proper
... If the State has the right to require a license tax of
merchants and others engaging in business ...it cer-
tainly has the right to require a license tax of those who
use the property of the State in carrying on their busi-
ness as do the fishermen mentioned in the statute." 8
A consideration of case law which further delineates the
power exercised by the state in regulating fishing within her
public waters involves two areas of concern. First, what are the
limits implied by the phrase "public waters" and what is the ex-
tent of power properly exercised by the state within these
limits? Second, to what extent is the power of the state limited
by the Federal maritime jurisdiction of the Federal government
as a common sovereign for the states?
EXTENT OF POWER WITHIN PUBLIC WATERS
Public waters simply mean those waters which are navigable
and the terms are interchangeable. 9 At common law in England
navigable waters were those which rose and fell with the tide,
regardless of their suitability for use by commercial vessels.' 0
This rule of common law has been followed neither in Virginia
nor, generally, in the United States; the navigability of a river
is determined by the navigability in fact of the river."
The rule which was adopted in the early law of Virginia was
set forth by Minor as follows:
Public waters mean navigable waters, and at com-
mon law they are waters wherein the tide ebbs andflows. In Virginia, however, any water is navigable
(and therefore public) which is capable of being navi-
gated by vessels employed in commerce (say of 20 ton
8 Morgan v. Comm., 98 Va. 812, 35 S.E. 448 (1900).
9 State v. Korrer, 127 Minn. 60, 148 N.W. 617, L.R.A. 1916 c. 322 (1914).
10 47 A.L.R. 2d S.2a.
"1Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954); Bolsa Land Co. v.
Burdick, 151 Cal. 254, 90 P. 532 (1907).
burden or more), whether the tide ebbs or flows there-
in or not, and whether connected with the sea or not.x1
The more recent test in Virginia is whether or not a stream
provides a useful channel for commerce. The test is substantially
the same as that stated by Minor and is followed in many other
American jurisdictions. 3
The regulatory power of the state over fishing, however, is
not limited by the determination that a body of water is not
navigable. Rather the power extends to all waters which allow
the fish passage to other fishing grounds of the state.14 The title
to soil under private waters in which the fish have ingress and
egress to public waters is in the riparian owner,15 subject to fish-
ing regulations imposed by the state.16 Since the general test of
state control of fish in private waters is the ability of the fish to
migrate, only a privately-owned body of water isolated from
public waters-such as a lake or pond-should be excluded from
regulations by the state. The regulatory power of the state in
privately owned waters is based almost as much upon the migra-
tory nature of the fish as upon the physical characteristics of the
body of water. Further, regulation by the state is not limited to
public waters in the sense of navigable waters, but desirably
enough, extends to waters in which there is a public interest.
A second, more pronounced limitation exists in favor of
riparian owners adjacent to navigable or public streams. In an
1870 decision, Yates v. Milwaukee,17 the United States Supreme
Court held that:
The owner of land bounded by a navigable river has
certain riparian rights, whether his title extends to the
middle of the stream or not.
12 Minor's Institutes, Vol. 11, p. 13 (1877), citing Warring v. Clark, 5 How.
441 (1846); Jackson v. James, 20"How. 296 (1857); The Dan'l Ball, 10
Wail. 563 (1870).
23 Springs Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Rivercomb, 106 Va. 176, 55 S.E. 580
(1906); Gratz v. McKee, 260 U.S. 127 (1922).
14 State v. So. Coal, etc., Co., 71 W.Va. 470, 76 S.E. 970 (1912).
15 Hampton v. Watson, 119 Va. 95, 89 S.E. 81 (1916); L.R.A. 1916 f 189
(1916).
16Va. Code, §62-2 (1950).
17 10 Wall. 497 (1870).
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The regulatory power of the -state, therefore, was not absolute.
The opinion continued to state that...
These rights are valuable and are property, and can be
taken for the public good only when due compensation
is made.
These rights were held to be subject to the general acts of the
legislature for the protection of public rights. Included among
them were free access to the navigable part of the stream and the
right to erect landings, wharves and piers.
A confusion of terminology, if not law, has resulted from
the application by state courts of the above rule of riparian
rights. As pointed out in Yates v. Milwaukee,is Wisconsin had
adopted an even broader rule which gave the riparian title to the
center of the stream subject to a public easement for navigation.
An 1876 case in Virginia, Norfolk City v. Cooke,19 cited
Yates v. Milvaukee in stating that a riparian owner had property
in the soil up to the line of navigability. While the rights in-
volved were not increased, the language of the Virginia court
appeared to extend the Yates decision. In the Yates case, abstract
rights were held to have property value; here the landowner was
given property in tangible soil beneath the stream since "... . the
wharf, pier or bulkhead can only be built on the soil." 20 This
language, as well as the reason which justified it, was unnecessary
to the result reached in the Cooke case. The two cases reached
identical results by different language.
In Alexandria & Fred. Railway Co. v. Faunce,21 in 1879, the
riparians' property right was held to apply to the right of fishery
in the Potomac River. Again Yates v. Milwaukee was cited, but
here the court reiterated the precise language of its precedent.
Fortunately, subsequent decisions have either ignored or over-
looked the language of the Cooke case. The apparent conflict
never matured. Undoubtedly, the ownership of soil beneath
18 id. at page 504.
19 27 Gratt. (68 Va.) 430 (1876) at p. 435.
20 bid.
2131 Gratt. (72 Va.) 761 (1879).
navigable rivers is in the state;22 and the Virginia Code which so
provided in express terms, is declaratory of the common law.2
Hence, by the Faunce case, state control of fishing in public
waters was merely limited to require compensation for injury to
existing fishing rights. No title to the river bed, water nor the
fish therein was vested in the riparian owners.
The decision in the Faunce case also asserted the limitation
imposed by riparian rights in navigable streams which were sub-
ject to the ebb and flow of the tide (as opposed to inland streams
which were the subject of the Yates case.) At early common
law in Virginia the title of landowners adjacent to the waters
ended at high-watermark.24  The Code of 1873 extended the
landowners' property to low-watermark,5 and a similar provision
was included in the 1950 Code.26  It was held in 1899 that a
grant to high-watermark vested title to low-watermark unless a
contrary intention was made manifest upon the face of the deed.27
In 1902 it was held that the boundary of a grantee to low-water-
mark shifted with deposits made by accretion.28 The title ac-
quired by a grantee to low-watermark has been held to be a fee
simple title.P Further, the term "low-watermark" means ordi-
nary low-watermark50 and is not broken by a dip or "gut" made
in marsh land, preventing an appearance of low-watermark at its
normal line.31
While the fee, of the riparian has been extended to low-
watermark, the regulatory power of the state has undergone no
significant change as a result of the extension. By definition, the
area between high-watermark and low-watermark at high tide,
22Taylor v. Comm., 102 Va. 759, 47 SE. 875 (1904); Grinels v. Daniels, 110
Va. 874, 67 S.E. 534 (1910).
2 3 Va. Code §62-1 (1950). And see Mericith v. Triple Island GunningClub, 113 Va. 80, 73 S.E. 721 (1912).
24 Minor's Institutes, Vol. 11, p. 14; 2 Hen.Stat. 456 (1679).
2 5 Va. Code, 1873, c. 62, §§1, 2.
26 Va. Code, §62-2 (1950).
27 The Waverly Water-Front Improvement Co. v. White, 97 Va. 176, 33
S.E. 534 (1899); French v. Bankhead, 11 Gratt. 136 (1854).
28 C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Walker, 100 Va. 69,40 S.E. 633 (1902).
2 9 Taylor v. Comm., 102 Va. 759, 47 S.E. 875 (1904) aft. in Hampton v
Watson, 119 Va. 95, 89 S.E. 81 (1916).
3o Scott v. Doughty, 124 Va. 358, 97 S.E. 802 (1919).
3 1 Whealton v. Doughty, 112 Va. 649, 91 S.. 802 (1911).
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just as the water of an inland stream from which fish have free
passage, should be considered part of the public waters of the
state. Logically, the regulatory power of the state should be the
same in both bodies of water, subject (in the case of navigable
waters) to the limitations imposed by the Yates case and the
Faunce case.
The qualified rights of tidewater riparians do not end with
their fee title at low-watermark. Numerous Virginia cases in ad-
dition to the Faunce case have extended them into the territorial
waters3 2 of the state beyond that point. The nature of such
rights beyond low-watermark has further defined the regulatory
power of the state in its public waters. A fourth limitation of
the power exercised by the state has been established thereby.
Groner v. Foster in 1897, citing Norfolk City v. Cooke,
the Faunce case and Yates v. Mil'waukee, restated the rights es-
tablished in those cases and added...
• . . the right to have the extent of such enjoyment
upon the line of navigability determined and marked,
and its boundaries defined...
concluding that . . .
•.. a court of equity is the proper tribunal to make the
apportionment and determine and establish the boun-
dary lines of the coterminous owners.
The language of the court provided a definiteness not previously
voiced. While the specific rights might, by implication, vary in
each case, the prerogative of the landowner to have set aside
marked areas within which state regulation was subordinated to
his riparian rights was firmly established.
Prior to 1904, Virginia decisions had only hinted as to the
ownership of soil beneath territorial waters of the state. A few
cases previously cited indicated that riparian owners had tide to
32 For purposes of the tidewater riparian, it is sufficient to designate "terri-
torial waters" as that body of water extending from low-watermark
to an unknown point in the sea.
3394 Va. 650, 27 S.E. 493 (1897).
soil up to the line of navigability,34 while all of them held only
that riparians enjoyed certain uses which constituted valuable
property. The determination of title to this soil was held un-
necessary in Groner v. Foster.
In Taylor v. Commonwealtl 3 5 in 1904, the plaintiff's bill
alleged fee simple ownership of soil in the bed of the York River
between low-watermark and the line of navigation. The plaintiff
sought to maintain the right to lease an oyster fishery in water up
to the line of navigability by leasing a one-acre fishery in a part
of those waters which the Commonwealth had attempted to make
the subject of a commercial grant.
The allegation was rejected by the court. The title to water
and the soil beneath it beyond low-watermark ...
... is in the state, but the riparian owner has certain
rights... but these rights of the state and of the riparian
owner must be exercised, if possible, so that the one shall
not necessarily disturb or impair the enjoyment of the
other. A riparian who is not disturbed in the enjoyment
of an existing or contemplated use... cannot complain
... [of state action].
It was further said that...
Whatever the soil beneath such navigable water contains
belongs to the State, and it alone has the right to de-
velop these hidden sources of wealth for the common
benefit of all its citizens.
Whatever doubts existed concerning state ownership of
tide-waters after the decision in McCready v. Commoncwealtbis
in 1876 were extinguished by the 1904 decision of Taylor v.
Commonwealtb.3
McCready's case, as the decision was popularly known, up-
held an act of the state legislature which prohibited the planting
of oysters within the waters of the state by non-residents in
84Norfolk City v. Cooke, 27 Grart. (68 Va.) 430 (1876).
35 102 Va. 759, 47 SE. 875 (1904).
36 27 Gratt. (68 Va.) 985, aff. in 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
37 102 Va. 759, 47 S.E. 875 (1904).
order to reserve a fishing common to the citizens of Virginia.
The power of the state to pass this act was based upon owner-
ship by the state of fish within its public waters. In effect, it
was held that Virginia owned the fish in trdst for her citizens,
and the act of legislature was merely regarded as a regulatory
action under such trust for the benefit of the public. In spite of
the language of the court, the facts of the case did not imply ab-
solute ownership by the state to the detriment of the public
right of fishery.
Yet, the authority vested in the state after McCready's Case
and the Taylor case was more absolute than at any previous date
in the history of Virginia law. The state not only owned the
public waters and the fish therein, but was, as well, the owner
of the soil beneath the waters and whatever the soil contained.
Paradoxically, while the ownership established in Taylor v.
Commonwealth was said to be for the benefit of all citizens, the
result was to deny a riparian owner the right of fishery, since it
had not previously been exercised or contemplated. This result
presented a contrast to the result in McCready's Case which
denied rights to non-residents. In the strictest sense, plaintiff's
fishery was not an existing fishery of the type protected in the
Faunce case, since it was not located in the precise area which
had been granted by the state. By analogy, however, it is doubt-
ful that the state would have been permitted to make a grant from
a riparian's low-watermark seaward simply because the riparian
had not previously contemplated an exercise of his rights in
those waters.
Considered as a whole, the decision in Taylor v. Common-
wealth could not be classified as unreasonable or harsh. It was,
however, indicative of a trend toward discrediting the theory of
ownership of fish by the state in trust for the public.
In Hampton v. Watson38 in 1916 it was held that since tidal
waters were owned by the state, a municipal corporation had the
right to use such waters for sewage disposal even though injury
to existing oyster beds resulted. The opinion of the court which
mentioned the public trust imposed upon the state ownership of
fish in public waters included the following statement:
8 City of Hampton v. Watson, 119 Va. 95, 89 S.E. 81 (1916).
The title of the state to the sea coast and the shores of'
,the tidal rivers is different from the fee simple.., and
... a trust is engrafted upon this title for the benefit of
the public of which the state is powerless to divest itself
... except for some public purpose, or some reasonable
use, which can fairly be said to be for the public bene-
fit.3D
The opinion continued iis follows:
... we are of opinion that... Hampton has the right
to use the waters.., for the purpose of carrying off its
refuse and sewage to the sea so long as such use does
not constitute a public nuisance and as such be dis-
continued by-the legislature .. .40
Despite the public. interest involved in efficient sewage dis-
posal,41 the Watson case allowed considerable disparity in con-
trast to prior decisions such as McCready's Case, the Faunce case
and the Taylor case. First, an exception was made to the trust
doctrine; second, actual injury was allowed to an existing right
of fishery.
In 1932 the executive branch of the state, having determined
that the legislature had abused its trust of "the right of fishery,
sought to enjoin the City of Newport News from emptying raw
sewage into Hampton Roads. In Commbnwealth v. Newport
News,42 the court held that the extent to which the waters were
used for fisheries or sewage disposal was within the discretion of
the legislature and subject to no trust not imposed by, the Con-
stitution of Virginia.48
Since the Constitution of Virginia contains but one trust
provision44 which imposes a trust upon the "... . natural oyster
39 Ibid. at p. 100. Notice that the court cited a New York case for this
exception to the trust doctrine. Coxe v. State, 144 N.Y. 396, 39 N.E.
400 (1895).
40 Ibid. at p. 100, and p. 101, citing a Massachusetts case. Haskell v. New
Bedford, 108 Mass. 208, 214 (1871).
41 Ibid. at p. 102.
42 158 Va. 521, 164 S.E.2d 689 (1932).
43 Ibid. at p. 556. The holding was preceded by a lengthy criticism of the
nus doctrine and a citation, among others,, of the case of Hampton
v. Watson, supra. -.
44 Va. Constitution §175.
beds, rocks and shoals ..." in the tidal waters of the state, the
long-recognized trust doctrine appears to have been otherwise
discarded.
The rule initiated in Hampton v., Watson in 1916 was af-
firmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Darling v. Newport News4 r in 1918. The rule recited in Com-
monwealth v. Newport News in 1932 was substantially identical
but more emphatically stated.
While those decisions dealt with the unique problem of sew-
age disposal-a vital public interest itself-their effect upon the
public right of fishery was not made less harmful by virtue of
their uniqueness. Further, they constituted an undeniable de-
parture from the Faunce case, McCready's Case and even Taylor
v. Commonwealth (which was an intermediary decision) to the
extent that the right of fishery constituted a common link of sim-
ilarity among the cases. By those decisions, also, the power of
the state to regulate fishing in its coastal, public waters became
virtually unlimited.
The cases are susceptible of an interpretation which does not
require the regulations by the state to be for the public interest
in its ordinary sense. The single limitation, if it can be con-
sidered a limitation at all, is the benevolence of legislative dis-
cretion.
LIMITATION OF POWER BY FEDERAL MARITIME
JURISDICTION
It has been consistently held in the courts of Virginia that
The navigable waters beyond low-watermark... within
the territorial limits of a State are the property of the
State to be controlled by the State.46
45 123 Va. 14, 96 SE. 307, aff. in 249 U.S. 540 (1918). For a complete dis-
cussion of this rule and its application in other jurisdictions, see 3
A.L.R. 762.
46Taylor v. Com., 102 Va. 759, 47 SE. 875 (1904) citing McGready's case,
31 Gratt. (68 Va.) 985 (1876); French v. Bankhead, 11 Gratt. (52 Va.)
136 (1854).
It is, also, generally conceded that the state may regulate fishing
within her limits where not restricted by the United States Con-
stitution.47
The extent afforded the territorial limits or waters of a state,
however has been the subject of perpetual diversity of opinion in
courts throughout the United States. A precise statement of the
area encompassed by the phrase "territorial waters" is difficult.
Due to the multitude of purposes for which jurisdiction is in-
voked in those areas, a precise statement might be undesirable,
since an adequate coverage of the many issues requires flexibility.
The public right of fishery has been held to extend to high-
watermark in spite of the riparian's ownership in fee to low-
watermark.48  The main source of conflict has arisen from the
attempt to determine the distance jurisdiction should extend
from high-watermark seaward. Some authorities have stated that
sovereign jurisdiction should extend a reasonable distance from
the shore-once the distance reached by a cannon shot.42 A rea-
sonable distance was considered that distance which was reason-
able for the particular purpose invoking jurisdiction. It could be
increased as the range of cannon increased.50 Similarly, the right
to fish and regulate fishing normally implies a reasonable use of
waters.51
A lucid analysis of the problems which cloud the definition
of territorial waters was made in Manchester v. Massachysett 58
in 1890. In that case, the validity of a Massachusetts statute, reg-
ulating the taking of fish for menhaden in Buzzard's Bay, was
questioned. Argument for the plaintiff in error, who sought to
evade the jurisdiction of Massachusetts courts, stated, in part, as
follows:
At the time of the treaty of Paris, in 1783, the territorial
domain of England extended upon her coast to low
47Boggs v. Comm., 76 Va. 989 (1882); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v.
Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
48 Allen v. Allen, 19 R.I. 114, 32 A. 166 (1895); State v. So. Coal, etc., Co.,
71 W.Va. 470, 76 S.E. 970 (1912).
49 1 Kent. 29.
GO Hall, International Law, 157.
51 Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 126 Tex. 129, 58 S.W.2d 566 (1933).
52 139 U.S. 240 (1890), citing 10 Peters 367 (1842).
watermark, including all bays, harbors, and inlets within
the 'fauces terrae', where a man can reasonably discern
from shore to shore . . . Within these limits was 'the
body of the country'. Within them the title to tide
waters and the soil beneath was in the crown.
Without these limits were the 'high seas', the common
property of all nations. Over them England, as one of
the common sovereigns of the ocean, had certain rights
of jurisdiction and dominion derived from and sanc-
tioned by the agreement of nations . . . These rights
belonged to England as a member of the family of na-
tions, and did not constitute her the possessor of a
proprietary title in any part of the high seas nor add
any portion of these waters to her realm. In their na-
ture they were rights of dominion and sovereignty
rather than of property... The law of England was in-
troduced and established in the colonies...
Such, then, was the territorial domain and such the
extraterritorial right of jurisdiction which Massachu-
setts possessed and could have exercised as an inde-
pendent State when she adopted the federal Constitu-
tion . . . As an independent 'nation she could have
undoubtedly enacted a statute like the one under dis-
cussion, which her own courts would have enforced
and which other nations would have recognized ...
Whatever of such rights Massachusetts possessed pre-
vious to the formation of the federal government she
possessed wholly by virtue of an agreement between
herself as a nation and other nations...
When she became a State in the Union she not only on
general principles merged her nationality in that of the
United States, but by express concession she agreed to
these clauses of the Constitution. Article I., section
10. 'No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance or
confederation.' 'No State shall without the consent of
Congress enter into any agreement or compact with an-
other State or with a foreign power.'
Thus, Massachusetts was cut off from entering into
such agreements with foreign nations as make up the
body of international law. Not only could she enter
into no new agreement, but the continuance of exist-
ing agreements was terminated . ..
The control over the fisheries of the ocean, resting as
it did upon such agreement and usage, was surrendered
with the power to contract with the sovereign States.
This was not a surrender of territory that belonged to
her, but of dominion over the common territory of the
nations.P
The opinion of the court, which rejected the foregoing argu-
ment, was delivered by Mr. Justice Blatchford. Citing Cooley
v. Board of Port Wardens,54 he concluded that while the juris-
diction of the state as a sovereign in bays and waters adjacent to
its coasts might have been granted to the United States, control
of fishery therein remained in the state absent affirmative control
by Congress. The court expressly declined to determine the
power of Congress to regulate fishery within the territorial
waters of a state. Numerous authorities were cited, however,
which held that the territorial jurisdiction of a nation extended
one marine league (three miles) from its coast and included bays
less than two marine leagues in width at the mouth.55
It is at least arguable on the basis of Manchester v. Massa-
chusetts that the territorial waters of a state, extending three
miles seaward from the coast line, are subject to the concurrent
jurisdiction of the state and federal governments-that the states,
upon joining the Union ceded their territorial waters as nations
to the United States. The United States, in turn, by silence per-
mitted the states to exercise sovereign power over these waters.
This argument for concurrent jurisdiction is tenable in spite
of such cases as Dunham v. Lamphere56 and McCready's CaseV
which were cited in Manchester v. Massachusetts and expressly
negatived any grant of power over fisheries to the United States.
Control of fishery was an attribute of British sovereignty which
was gained by the independent states in their sovereign capacity.
Certainly a cession of their sovereign power to the United States
should have included a cession of their control over fishery. The
argument was not overcome .by the holding in Manchester v.
Massachusetts-it was skirted by invoking the rule of Cooley v.
Board of Port Wardens.
5 Ibid. at p. 246.
5 12 How. 299 (1851).
65 Manchester v. Mass, op. cit. supra, at p. 258.
56 3 Gray 268 (1855).
S7 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
The argument was never a clear issue in either Dunham v.
Lamphere or McCready v. Commonwealth. In the former case
it was held that the regulation of fisheries was left to the states by
the United States Constitution since not expressly delegated to
the United States-the power could scarcely be left to the states
if they never possessed it in their capacity as states. The latter
case merely held that specific fishing regulations imposed by Vir-
ginia violated neither the commerce clause5s nor the privileges and
immunities clause of the United States Constitution. The precise
argument presented by the plaintiff-in-error in the Manchester
case was that Great Britain herself had no regulatory power be-
yond her low-watermark except in her sovereign capacity. It
presented a question of the general maritime jurisdiction of the
Federal government as a common sovereign for the states.
Despite the argument, the law, as applied, was neither con-
troverted nor criticized until a series of cases culminating with
United States v. Texas59' in 1950 and known as Tidelands de-
cisions.60
It was held in United States v. Louisiana, decided on the
same day as United States v. Texas and concerning the rights of
the United States in the coastal waters of Louisiana, that:
If the property, whatever it may be, lies seaward of low-
watermark, its use, disposition, management, and control
involve national interest and national responsibilities,
thereby giving rise to paramount national rights in it61
The complaint in United States v. Texas alleged that the United
States %vas...
. . . the owner in fee simple of, or possessed of para-
mount rights in, and full dominion and power over, the
5 8 The regulation of fishery in a reasonable manner does not constitute an
interference with interstate commerce sufficient to fall within the Con-
stitutional prohibition. State v. Harrub, 95 Ala. 176, 10 So. 752 (1892);
Ex Parte Fritz, 86 Miss. 210, 38 So. 722 (1905).
59 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
60 United States v. Cal., 332 U.S. 19 (1947); United States v. Louisiana, 339
U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
61 United States v. La, 339 U.S. 699 (1950) at p. 701.
lands, minerals and other things . . . lying seaward of
the ordinary low-watermark on the coast of Texas and
outside of the inland waters, extending seaward to the
outer edge of the continental shelf... 2
The complaint was upheld. The court had found in the
Louisiana case that Louisiana, like the original thirteen colonies,
had never owned the marginal or coastal seas beyond low-water-
mark. In the Texas decision it was stated:
We assume that as a Republic she [Texas] had not only
full sovereignty over the marginal sea but ownership of
it, of the land underlying it, and of all the riches which
it held. in other words, we assume that it then had the
dorninium and imperium in and over this belt which the
United States now claims. When Texas came into the
Union, she ceased to be an independent nation... In
external affairs the United States became the sole and
exclusive spokesman for the nation. We hold that as
an incident to the transfer of that sovereignty any claim
that Texas may have had to the marginal sea was re-
linquished to the United States.0
The decisions in the Louisiana and Texas cases were the
exact opposite of those in McCready's Case and the Manchester
case. If a comparison was to be made, it was between the argu-
ment favoring the expansion of Federal maritime jurisdiction in
the Manchester case and the basis of decision in the Texas case.
Of course, the Texas decision did not specify that fishery in ter-
ritorial waters fell within the regulatory power of the Federal
government. Federal regulation in similar instances has thus far
been limited to situations in which an international interest was
involved." Even this regulation met strong opposition which
led to the proposed Bricker Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion.
Conceivably, fishery could have been distinguished and ex-
cluded from the Texas decision, but such a distinction was un-
6 2United States v. Tex, op. cit. supra, at p. 709.
63 Ibid. at p. 717.
6 4 See, for example, the leading case of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920).
likely in view -of dominant trends in the current Supreme Court
decisions. Those trends were limited in- 1953 by the Submerged
Lands Act65 which fixed the territorial limits of each coastal, state
at a point three miles from its coast. Thus, Congress attempted
to restore the law which existed before the Tidelands decisions.
That law itself left doubt concerning .the ownership of fish
and regulation of fishing in coastal waters. The doubt cannot be
resolved solely by the courts. Currently, such jurisdictional
questions involve as many political as legal issues.66 The extent
of Federal power must ultimately be determined in accordance
with the balance of power established between the Supreme Court
and Congress, in the first instance, and between those bodies and
the individual state, in the second. Until some more definite bal-
ance of power is established, the states must be deemed free to
exercise regulatory powers over fishery in their territorial waters
-at least while Congress remains silent.
65 43 US.C.A. 1301.
66 The Tidelands decisions are discussed as they relate to the Segregatiqn
cases and other much-criticised decisions by the Supreme Court in 42
A.B.A.J. 730 (1956). See also, 42 AB.A.J. 727 (1956), for a suggested
limitation of power in the Supreme Court by the interposition of state
sovereignty. Regulation of fishing in the high seas beyond the three-
mile limit and its relationship to International Law are discussed in
42 A.B3A.J. 235 (1956).
